What challenges did Instamojo experience when rapidly onboarding thousands of micro-merchants onto the storefront product in just 15 months?

The storefront pricing that you're seeing today is the third revision of pricing in the last 12 months. We were never a SaaS business. First of all, we never thought merchants were going to pay by their own accord. Because nobody in India thinks that small businesses, let alone micro merchants, are going to pay for software. They're actually wrong. The vast majority of the merchants are paying by themselves after gravitating from the free tier to the paid tier. That I would attest maybe to COVID because it's a significant tailwind that happened recently. 

But nobody in this country, other than us, has figured out the micro merchant base, who, as I said, are the largest in number but have a significantly high mortality rate. And the ability to pay is also limited because, as I said, they are doing $10,000 sales, and you cannot charge them $1000. So that took us a lot of time. But with a certain degree of confidence, I can tell you after 12 months, and three revisions, I think we have figured out the pricing strategy that works. Internally, we have something called a cost-to-value ratio. How much should I charge, and how much value should you derive? If they make $10,000 max and let's say the gross margin of the merchant is 40%. So that means at the end of the year, she makes about $4,000. How much can you charge out of $4,000, which she's happy to pay again and again, without thinking about switching? So today, we are charging about 4-5%. So we charge you five rupees, you are able to make 100 rupees. And our idea is that over a period of time, as we increase the base, our cost-to-value ratio should go down. Our internal estimate is we want to go to 1%. We should charge one rupee for you to make 100 rupees. And you can only do it on a much larger scale than we are currently.