Kling subscriptions scaled before enterprise

This shows Kling was already a real prosumer software business before it became a larger enterprise sales business. By April and May 2025, subscriptions alone were booking more than RMB100M per month, which means individual creators were already paying at scale for faster generation, more credits, and better controls. Enterprise revenue then layered on top of an already working consumer engine instead of rescuing weak demand.

• The subscription product was concrete and monetizable early. Kling launched paid tiers at RMB66, RMB266, and RMB666 per month, each bundling credits and premium creation features like higher performance mode, longer clips, and more control over shots. That is a classic prosumer funnel, free access for experimentation, then paid upgrades for heavier creators.
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• The speed matters. Kuaishou disclosed that Kling crossed a $100M annualized run rate in March 2025, then said subscription bookings alone topped RMB100M in both April and May 2025. That means consumer monetization scaled almost immediately after launch, before the enterprise base became large enough to dominate the story.
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• Enterprise still became the bigger growth lever later. Kuaishou said Kling served over 10,000 corporate clients by May 2025, then 30,000 plus customers in its 2025 ESG report. In adjacent AI video, Higgsfield followed a similar pattern of starting with creators and marketers, then expanding into workflow and API usage for higher value professional use cases.
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Going forward, this mix points to a two engine model. Subscriptions keep feeding product feedback, model training, and global distribution, while enterprise and API contracts raise average revenue per account. The likely end state is a creator product that behaves like a consumer app on the surface, but earns more and more like business software underneath.